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COMMENTS
NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND
HOSPITALS CORPORATION v. PERALES:
UNCLEAR CONGRESSIONAL INTENT,
PERMISSIBLE AGENCY
INTERPRETATION
INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Social Security Amendments of 19651
represented a milestone in American health care financing.2 The
Amendments included the addition of Titles XVIII and XIX, the
Medicare 3 and Medicaid 4 programs, respectively. Medicare is a na-
tionwide, federally funded insurance program which provides for
medical care cost reimbursement primarily to beneficiaries aged 65
and over, regardless of income or wealth.5 The program is divided
into two parts: Part A (basic insurance), which provides for inpa-
tient hospital care,6 and Part B (supplemental insurance), which
' Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965); see also Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat.
620 (1935) (original Social Security legislation to which Amendments were added).
2 See MARGARET GREENFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: THE 1965 AND 1967 SOCIAL SE-
CURITY AMENDMENTS V (1968) ("by far the broadest extension of the social insurance princi-
ple in the 30-year history of American social security").
3 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395-1395ccc (West 1992).
" Id. §§ 1396-1396u.
5 See ROBERT J. BUCHANAN & JAMES D. MINOR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE REIM-
BURSEMENT 17 (1985) (anyone 65 or over qualifying for monthly Social Security benefits is
entitled to Medicare); see also infra notes 8-15 and accompanying text (discussing details of
Medicare eligibility).
6 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395c-1395i-4(k); id. § 1395c (Part A "provides basic protection
against the costs of hospital, related post hospital, home health services, and hospice care");
see also S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1943, 1946-48 (description of Part A services). See generally Lynn M. Etheredge, Overview:
The Need for Reform, in MEDICARE PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REFORM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 1, 2
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provides for certain physician services, hospital outpatient services,
and other health care services generally not covered under Part A.'
Medicare Part A enrollment is automatic upon eligibility8 and
generally does not require a monthly premium.9 Under Part A,
when a beneficiary receives medical care for a covered service,
100% of the health care provider's "reasonable cost" is paid for by
the federal government.10 In contrast, Medicare Part B enrollment
is voluntary"' and requires a monthly premium.'2 Under Part B,
the federal government only pays 80% of reasonable cost,'3 with
the remaining 20% the responsibility of the beneficiary. 4 This
20% is known as "coinsurance.' 15
(John F. Holahan & Lynn M. Etheredge eds., Urban Inst. Press) (1986) ("hospital costs...
accounted for nearly 70 percent of Medicare spending"); HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES § 4 (1977) (overview of Part A benefits).
' See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395j-1395w-4(j); BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note 5, at 18-19 (Part
B offers broad range of benefits, including physician services and outpatient hospital ser-
vices); GREENFIELD, supra note 2, at 9 (Part B covers services not covered under Part A);
MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 6 (summary of Part B benefits); see also S. REP. No. 404, supra
note 6, at 7-9, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1948-50 (brief summary of Part B
provisions).
8 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND
ANALYSIS 141 (1988) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK]; see GREENFIELD, supra note 2, at 1 (Part A
is funded by employers and employees through social security payroll taxes); see also S.
REP. No. 404, supra note 6, at 2, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1943 (Part A character-
ized as "compulsory"); MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 3 (discussing of other categories of per-
sons also covered under Medicare Part A); 1982 MEDICARE EXPLAINED 8 (CCH 1982) (vast
majority of beneficiaries become entitled to Part A simply by virtue of eligibility for Social
Security retirement or survivor benefits).
I See BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note 5, at 17. A monthly premium is required if the
individual is not entitled to either "monthly Social Security, railroad retirement, or survivor
benefits" or has not "paid Social Security payroll taxes for a certain number of quarters."
Id.
10 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395f(b)(1)(A), (B) (amount paid to provider of services is reasona-
ble cost or customary charge, whichever is less); see also S. REP. No. 404, supra note 6, at 6,
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1947 ("Payment of bills under the basic plan would be
made to the providers of service on the basis of the 'reasonable cost' incurred in providing
care for beneficiaries.").
" MEDICARE EXPLAINED, supra note 8, at 1; see also S. REP. No. 404, supra note 6, at 2,
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1943 (Part B referred to as "voluntary").
12 See BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note 5, at 18 (monthly premium in 1984 totaled
$14.60); see also S. REP. No. 404, supra note 6, at 7, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1948
(original Part B legislation called for monthly premium of $3.00).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395l(a)(1).
'4 See BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note 5, at 19 ("Part B usually pays 80 percent of the
reasonable charges of covered services, with the remaining 20 percent the responsibility of
the beneficiary."). See generally GREENFIELD, supra note 2, at 13-14 (discussing of Part B
beneficiaries' cost responsibilities).
18 In addition to the 20% coinsurance payment required of Part B insureds, both Part
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While Medicare is an insurance program, Medicaid is a medi-
cal care subsidy for the poor1" and is funded jointly by the federal
and state governments. 17 Each state prepares its own Medicaid fee
schedule which delineates a fixed cost-usually less than 80% of
Medicare's "reasonable cost"-for each item or service to be cov-
ered.1" A health care provider who agrees to serve Medicaid benefi-
ciaries must accept this fixed Medicaid fee as payment in full;1 9 the
provider may charge neither the beneficiary nor the state for any
additional amount.20
Although Medicare and Medicaid are funded differently21 and
A and Part B patients must pay deductibles. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 141 ("Medicare
beneficiaries are liable for cost-sharing, deductible and coinsurance payments . . . ."); see
also infra note 43 and accompanying text (brief discussion of cost-sharing). Part B deduct-
ibles, with certain exceptions, are "$100 for 1991 and subsequent years." 42 U.S.C.A. §
13951(b).
'6 See S. REP. No. 404, supra note 6, at 9, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1950
(Medicaid expanded prior welfare programs to cover individuals with "sufficient financial
need"); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (Medicaid provides "federal fi-
nancial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for
needy persons.").
17 See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 1-2 (states spent $24.5 billion on Medicaid ser-
vices while federal government contributed, or "matched," $30.7 billion, for total Medicaid
expenditures of $55.2 billion); see also id. at 1 (Medicaid described as "Federal-State enti-
tlement program"); GREENFIELD, supra note 2, at 105 ("generous federal participation in
program costs" offered to participating states). Although state participation in Medicaid is
optional, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (federal money is made available only to states with ap-
proved medical assistance plans), all states have taken part. See SOURCE BooK, supra note
8, at 167.
As of 1988, 24.2 million persons were Medicaid beneficiaries. Id. at 1. Of these 24.2
million people, the three largest groups were: 1) dependent children at 10.4 million; 2)
adults in families at 6.2 million; and 3) persons age 65 and over at 3.5 million. Id.
"5 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 121 ("Most States have now moved to 'prospective'
payment systems, under which the amount of payment [for Medicare health care providers]
is established in advance."); National Senior Citizens Law Center, States Refuse to Pay
Medicare Deductibles and Co-Payments for Medicare-Medicaid Dual Eligibles, 16
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 129, 129 (1982) [hereinafter Law Center] (Medicaid rate usually lower
than 80% of Medicare's reasonable cost).
" See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 123. Although states have been granted wide
latitude by the federal government to develop reimbursement schemes, three statutory con-
straints always apply: 1) providers must, with few exceptions, accept the Medicaid payment
as payment in full; 2) Medicaid reimbursement is secondary to any other source of health
coverage available to beneficiaries; and 3) payments must be "consistent with efficiency,
economy, and quality of care." Id. (citation omitted).
20 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(d) (charging in excess of state plan rate is punishable by
fine of not more than $25,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than five years).
21 See Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A Chal-
lenge to Federalism, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 855, 856 (1990) (Medicare financed through separate
wage tax; Medicaid financed by state and federal general revenues).
1993]
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administered separately,22 Medicare section 1395v23 and its related
sections24 create an interplay between the two programs.2 5 These
sections permit states to enter into "buy-in" agreements with the
federal government, whereby the state agency administering the
Medicaid program pays Medicare Part B premiums on behalf of
the state's Medicaid beneficiaries who also qualify for Medicare,
i.e., people who are both poor and elderly, or "dual eligibles. '26
This interplay has spawned an important question of statutory in-
terpretation, namely, whether a provider who serves dual eligibles
may obtain reimbursement from the state Medicaid program for
the 20% Part B coinsurance which Medicare does not reimburse.
Recently, the Second Circuit in New York City Health and Hospi-
tals Corporation v. Perales27 ("HHC") answered this question in
the affirmative.
This Comment suggests that the HHC case was incorrectly de-
cided. Part I outlines the facts of HHC and highlights the more
notable aspects of the district and appellate court decisions. Part
II traces the statutory evolution of the buy-in agreement, noting
conflicts and inconsistencies and suggesting that the relevant stat-
utes are facially unclear and lack an apparent legislative direction.
Finally, Part III reviews the federal agency interpretations of the
22 Id. ("Medicaid is jointly administered by the states and the federal government"
while Medicare "is characterized by federal administration ...."). Compare SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 8, at 167 (states administer Medicaid programs with U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services oversight) with MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 392, at 298 (federal gov-
ernment selects "fiscal intermediates" such as Aetna Life & Casualty Co. and Blue Cross
Assoc. for filing and processing Medicare beneficiaries' claims).
23 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395v (titled "Agreements with States").
24 See, e.g., id. §§ 1395v(h), 1396a(a)(10)(E), 1396a(n); see also infra notes 63-73 and
accompanying text (full discussion of §§ 1396a(a)(10)(E) and 1396a(n)).
2" See New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Perales, No. CIV.-87-4896(MJL), 1991
WL 41559, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1991) ("conflation... of statutes"); see also infra notes
52-84 and accompanying text (discussing of interrelationship between Medicare and Medi-
caid statutes).
11 See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 141; see also Law Center, supra note 18, at 129
(elderly poor who are eligible for Medicare are "dual eligibles").
States have entered into buy-in agreements simply to save money. See Congressional
Budget Office Options for Reducing Medicare and Medicaid Spending, MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) § 37,021, at 16,398 (Mar.-Sept. 1988) ("[Sltates save roughly 75% of
what would otherwise be costs for their Medicaid programs."); see also Complaint at 7, Katz
v. Myers, CV82-1134-LTL(Tx) (C.D. Cal. dismissed Apr. 5, 1982) ("Medicare premiums, co-
payments and deductibles are substantially less expensive [for the state] than the total cost
of providing health services for [dual eligibles].").
" New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Perales, 954 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 461 (1992).
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buy-in statutes, and concludes that these interpretations were per-
missible and worthy of the court's deference.
I. HHC FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SETTING
The New York Department of Social Services ("NYDSS")
submitted a state Medicaid plan to,28 and entered into a buy-in
agreement with,29 the United States Department of Health and
Human Services ("Department"). Through 1986, New York's plan
called for full payment of dual eligibles' Medicare Part B 20% co-
insurance.30 This policy was changed, however, effective January 1,
1987, with the passage of NYDSS regulation section 360-7.7,31
which the Department approved. 2
Section 360-7.7 was, in essence, an amendment to New York's
Medicaid plan, capping the State's Part B coinsurance obligation.
More specifically, the section 360-7.7 cap allowed the State not to
pay coinsurance when 80% of the Medicare reasonable cost for the
health care in question exceeded the Medicaid fee for the same
care.3 3 Unfortunately for health care providers, Medicaid fees were
28 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 363-a (McKinney 1993) (legislative directive for NYDSS
to submit State Medicaid plan to federal government); see also SOURCE BOOK, supra note 8,
at 167-68, tbl. VI-1 (all 50 states have submitted Medicaid plans).
'9 See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 142-43, tbl. IV-5 (all 50 states have entered into
buy-in agreements).
30 See Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 12-13, HHC, 954 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1992) (No.
91-6123) [hereinafter Defendants' Brief] ("Prior to [1987], the State authorized reimburse-
ment for dual eligibles at full Medicare rates, including coinsurance .... "); accord Brief
for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, HHC, 954 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-6123) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Brief] ("[H]istorically, the New York Medicaid Program reimbursed providers for
such cost-sharing amounts on behalf of Medicare recipients who were also Medicaid-
eligible.").
31 N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-7.7(b)(1) (1992). Section 360-7.7(b)(1)
reads in pertinent part that
the [Medicaid] program will pay on behalf of [Medicaid] recipients, including
qualified Medicare beneficiaries, the amount of any deductible or coinsurance lia-
bility incurred under Part B of [Medicare] if the Medicare Part B payment is less
than the established [Medicaid] fee. The [Medicaid] program will pay only the
difference between the Medicare Part B payment and the lower of the [Medicaid]
fee or the Medicare approved amount.
Id.; see also infra note 44 and accompanying text (brief discussion of qualified Medicare
beneficiaries, or "QMBs").
22 See HHC, 1991 WL 41559, at *2 ("On March 16, 1988 ... the Secretary approved
... § 360.10 .... "). The Court of Appeals referred to "§ 360.10" for consistency with the
district court opinion, even though the section had already been repealed and recodified as §
360-7.7. See HHC, 954 F.2d at 855 n.1.
3 See N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-7.7(b)(1); see also HHC, 1991 WL
41559, at *7 n.7 (three hypothetical reimbursement scenarios set forth). The following table,
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typically less than 80% of Medicare reasonable costs; this meant
that the State was usually not required to make any coinsurance
payments.34
The New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation 35 chal-
lenged the regulation in a suit filed in federal district court36
against the Department. 7 Plaintiff sought, inter alia, to strike
adapted from figures provided in the HHC district court opinion, illustrates the three reim-
bursement scenarios:
Scenario #1"* Scenario #2*** Scenario #3***
Medicaid Fee $45 $50 $70
Medicare $80 $60 $60
Reasonable Cost*
Medicare Part B $64 $48 $48
Payment Amount (80% of $80) (80% of $60) (80% of $60)
Medicaid $0 $2 $12
Balance Due ($45 - $64) ($50 - $48) ($60 - $48)
* The Medicare reasonable cost is also referred to as the "Medicare approved amount."
** If the Medicare payment amount exceeds the Medicaid fee, then the Medicaid program
need not pay any additional amount.
*** If the Medicare payment amount is less than the Medicaid fee, the Medicaid program
must pay the difference between the Medicare payment amount and the lower of the Medi-
caid fee and the Medicare reasonable cost.
Id. The vast majority of reimbursement situations fall within Scenario #1. See infra note
34.
The following is another reimbursement example: "[T]he Medicare allowable charge for
a particular service is $100 [and] Medicare pays $80, leaving $20 to be paid as coinsurance.
If the State's fee limit for the same service is $75, the State may conclude that the [pro-
vider] has already been paid in full." SOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 145.
" See HHC, 954 F.2d at 857 ("Medicaid payments are almost invariably less than 80%
."). By one estimate, the § 360-7.7 payment limit saved New York's Medicaid program
as much as $53 million in 1987. See Jeannie H. Cross, Social Services Cuts Medicaid Pay-
ments, TIMES UNION (Albany), July 17, 1987, at B5. A significant portion of the State sav-
ings has been absorbed by organizations like the Health and Hospitals Corporation, which
allegedly has lost $6 million per year since the regulation was passed. See Deborah Pines,
N.Y. Court Restores Supplemental Payment for Medicare Patients, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 17,
1992, at 54.
" See HHC, 954 F.2d at 855 (HHC described as "principal provider of hospital services
to the low-income population of [New York] City"). The other HHC plaintiffs included the
Medical Society of the State of New York, a voluntary association of New York doctors, and
Sidney Finkel and John Bleski, two doctors who treat patients eligible for both Medicare
and Medicaid. Id.
36 New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Perales, No. CIV. 87-4896(MJL), 1991 WL
41559 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1991).
7 Id.; see also HHC, 954 F.2d at 855 (plaintiffs named Department Secretary Louis W.
Sullivan and NYDSS Commissioner Cesar A. Perales as defendants). Commissioner Perales,
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down the regulation because it allegedly violated the statutory
right of health care providers to recover 100% of their Medicare
reasonable cost.3 s After deciding that the statutes involved were
"complicated, ambiguous, and often apparently conflicting," 39 and
that the Department's interpretation was permissible, 0 the district
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The Second Circuit reversed and entered summary judgment
in favor of plaintiff,41 declaring that the Department's interpreta-
tion was contrary to the clear congressional mandate and was
therefore not entitled to deference.42 Writing for the court, Judge
Feinberg explained that the language of Medicaid section
however, "concur[red] with the views of [Department Secretary] Sullivan" and did not file a
separate brief. Id.
18 See HHC, 1991 WL 41559, at *1-2. "Specifically, plaintiffs contend that § [360-7.7]:
1) deprives providers ... reimbursement of their reasonable costs ... in violation of the
Medicare Act (Count I); 2) violates the Medicare Act's prohibition of cost-shifting (Count
II); [and] 3) violates specified portions of the Medicaid Act's crossover provisions (Count
III) .... " Id. at *2. Although plaintiffs asserted that the State and the beneficiaries were
liable for reimbursement of reasonable costs, according to the court "[tihe real target of
plaintiffs' claims ... [was] not the beneficiary, but the state and its Medicaid plan." Id. at
*5. This same focus on the State's rather than the beneficiaries' obligations was evident at
the appellate level. See HHC, 954 F.2d at 857-58 ("[W]e must determine what New York
State's responsibility is ... for... 20% of reasonable costs .. ") (emphasis added); id. at
867 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (issue presented is whether "providers must be reimbursed
by the state") (emphasis added).
39 HHC, 1991 WL 41559, at *6.
40 Id. "[W]hile other interpretations may also be rational, it would not be appropriate
for this Court to overturn defendants' rational policy." Id.
Other grounds for granting defendants' motion were advanced by the district court, but
are not the focus of this Comment. These grounds include, for example, Medicaid as a third
party payor. See id. at *4. See generally SOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 141 ("Medicaid is
the payor of last resort, secondary to any other insurance coverage a beneficiary may have or
to any other third party who may be liable for medical payments or medical support on the
beneficiary's behalf."). Also beyond the scope of this Comment is any attempt to reconcile
the competing policy underpinnings of Medicare and Medicaid. See generally HHC, 1991
WL 41559, at *5 (discussion of statutes' underlying policies vis-a-vis beneficiaries and prov-
iders); RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & JOHN HOLAHAN, MEDICAID IN THE REAGAN ERA 17 (1982)
("How generous to recipients and providers a Medicaid program is designed to be varies
with the state's political philosophy and wealth.").
41 HHC, 954 F.2d at 855-56.
42 See id. at 863.
Sometimes we will find that Congress has not addressed the problem posed by a
particular case. In such circumstances, we are required to defer to administrative
expertise. But where we confront a statute that evinces a legislative purpose
clearly at odds with the proffered administrative interpretation, we should not
defer.
19931
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1396a(a)(10)(E)(i) directed states to pay Part B cost-sharing43 on
behalf of dual eligibles and on behalf of those elderly who were too
poor to afford Part B cost-sharing, but not poor enough to qualify
for Medicaid ("qualified Medicare beneficiaries" or "QMBs"). 4 In
reviewing the legislative history, the court stated that it was Medi-
care's policy to allow health care providers recovery of 100% of
reasonable costs. 45 To hold otherwise, according to the court,
would create a "wealth based, two-tiered system of health care"
that Congress specifically sought to avoid,46 i.e., a provider would
43 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(p)(3) (cost-sharing defined as including premiums, deduct-
ibles, and coinsurance).
44 See HHC, 954 F.2d at 859 ("apparent meaning" of § 1396a(a)(10)(E) was to direct
states to allocate funds for Part B premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance); see also 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396d(p)(1) (QMB definition).
In order for an individual to qualify as a QMB, three requirements must be satisfied.
First, a person must be entitled to Medicare Part A. Id. at § 1396d(p)(1)(A). Second, he or
she must have income not exceeding the official federal poverty line as determined under
the supplemental security income program. Id. at § 1396d(p)(1)(B). Finally, the individual
must not have resources exceeding twice the maximum amount allowed under the same
program. Id. at § 1396d(p)(1)(C).
Originally, states were permitted to buy-in only on behalf of persons eligible for both
Medicare and Medicaid, i.e., dual eligibles. See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 141-42
(describing pre-1986 buy-in requirements). In 1986, however, Congress, concerned about in-
dividuals not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid and too poor to afford Part B cost-shar-
ing, permitted states to buy-in for this new category of elderly which were designated
QMBs. See H.R. REP. No. 727, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3607, 3695 ("The Committee strongly encourages States to expand Medicaid
coverage to additional low-income elderly .... "); see also H.R. REP. No. 105(11), 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 57-8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 857, 880-81 (in 1986, only 1.1
million of 3.3 million elderly poor were entitled to Medicaid). See generally SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 8, at 143 (discussing states' option to cover QMBs).
At first, QMBs and dual eligibles were separate and distinct groups of beneficiaries, the
former only eligible for Medicare while the latter eligible for both. See Omnibus Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9403(b), 100 Stat. 1874, 2053-4 (1986) (QMB "means
an individual who is entitled to ... part A [but is] not eligible for [Medicaid]"). Now, the
QMB definition subsumes dual eligibles. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(p)(1) (current QMB defi-
nition). In HHC, the Second Circuit seemed to refer to QMBs and dual eligibles inter-
changeably. See, e.g., HHC, 954 F.2d at 857-58 ("We must determine what New York
State's responsibility is ... for the annual deductible and 20% of reasonable costs ... for
patients who are dual eligibles or QMBs.") (emphasis added).
" HHC, 954 F.2d at 858. The court repeated this 100% reimbursement theme through-
out its opinion. See, e.g., id. ("[T]here is nowhere articulated in the Medicare Act or regula-
tions an exception for dual eligibles or QMBs or any limitation on providers' express statu-
tory right to recover their full reasonable costs .... "); id. ("Medicare Act on its face
entitles providers to collect their reasonable costs"); id. at 860 ("Medicare provider need not
be satisfied with inadequate payment, i.e., less than reasonable costs"); id. at 861 ("guaran-
tee of reimbursement").
46 Id. at 859.
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be less likely to treat a patient if full payment was not assured.47
Finally, Judge Feinberg noted in dicta that even if the statutes
were unclear, the usual deference given to administrative agencies
would not have constrained the court because the Department's
own inconsistent policy statements eroded the integrity of its
position.48
Dissenting, Judge Cardamone criticized the court's premise
that the statutes specifically addressed the issue at hand.49 The ap-
propriate inquiry, according to the dissent, was not whether the
statute expressly allowed providers to recover coinsurance, but
whether the responsible agency's interpretation was contrary to
congressional purposes.50 Furthermore, Judge Cardamone noted
that Department policy revisions promulgated subsequent to the
enactment of the statutes were not arbitrary, but occasioned by
changed circumstances and case law.51
II. CLEAR CONGRESSIONAL INTENT?
STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF BUY-IN AGREEMENT
FROM 1965 TO PRESENT
A. Social Security Amendments of 1965
Although repealed in 1988, Medicaid section 1396a(a)(15),
part of the 1965 Medicaid legislation,52 dealt with the coinsurance
47 See id. (hospitals would be deterred from serving nonpaying or underpaying pa-
tients) (citing S. REP. No. 404, supra note 6, at 27, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1967-
68).
4, Id. at 861-62 ("The expertise in statutory interpretation to which we normally defer
becomes dubious when the expert cannot make up his own mind.").
49 Id. at 864 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in the language of these Acts ...
fairly supports an inference that Congress specifically intended crossover and QMB Part B
service providers to be reimbursed at the Medicare reasonable cost/charge level.") (emphasis
in original); see also id. (statute "simply does not lay out a 'clear' plan of Congress contrary
to the Secretary's construction") (emphasis in original); id. (statutes described as "ambigu-
ous and conflicting").
Id. at 863-64 (citing United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 666 (1986)).
, Id. at 867 (more important than agency's change of policy itself is "whether the
agency's change... rests on a 'well-considered basis' ") (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355-56 (1989)).
'- 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(15), repealed by Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 301(e)(2)(C), as added by Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-485, § 608(d)(14)(I)(iii), 102 Stat. 2343, 2416 (1988). From 1967 until its repeal in 1988,
§ 1396a(a)(15) said that a state Medicaid plan must
in the case of eligible individuals 65 years of age or older who are covered by
either or both of the insurance programs established by title XVIII, provide
where, under the plan, all of any deductible, cost sharing, or similar charge im-
1993]
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obligations of states when the states chose to enter into buy-in
agreements.53 Regrettably, the section was ambiguously worded. 4
Prior to its repeal, two federal district court decisions-James v.
Morris55 and Samuel v. California Department of Health Ser-
vices -each attempted to extract a sensible meaning from the
section.57 Both courts concluded that the state Medicaid -programs
could pay, at their discretion, part or all of dual eligibles' cost-
sharing charges.5 8
Although more plainly worded than the statute, the legislative
history accompanying section 1396a(a)(15) 59 seems similarly un-
posed with respect to such individual under the insurance program established by
such title is not met, the portion thereof which is met shall be determined on a
basis reasonably related . . . to such individual's income or his income and
resources.
Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub L. No. 90-248, § 235(a)(3), 81 Stat. 821, 1031
(1967) (amending § 1396a(a)(15) of Social Security Amendments of 1965).
11 See HHC, 954 F.2d at 860 (analyzing § 1396a(a)(15) as guide for understanding sec-
tion that replaced it). Although § 1396a(a)(15) is no longer in effect, HHC plaintiffs and
defendants referred to the section repeatedly in an effort to glean Congress' intent with
respect to buy-in agreements. See Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 30, passim; Defendants'
Brief, supra note 30, passim.
64 See supra note 52 (pertinent portion of § 1396a(a)(15) set out); see also infra note 57
(noting two federal district courts' characterizations of § 1396a(a)(15)'s unfortunate
wording).
55 Civ. Action No. 80-172-N (M.D. Ala., N. Div., Apr. 29, 1981) (unreported case); see
also Final Regulations on Buy-ins, Quality Control, Laboratory Animals, and Abortions,
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) § 36,762, at 15,777 (Sept. 1987-Mar. 1988) (noting
that copies of Morris are available from Health Care Financing Administration, an arm of
United States Department of Health and Human Services).
"' 570 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1983), as amended by 572 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
'7 See id. at 570 (legislative intent behind § 1396a(a)(15) with respect to level of health
care provider reimbursement was "unclear"); Morris, Civ. Action No. 80-172-N, at 3 (noting
§ 1396a(a)(15)'s "bewildering language").
58 See Samuel, 570 F. Supp. at 570 n.2 ("[H]ad the statute required a State plan to
relate the unmet portion of Medicare Part B deductible and coinsurance costs to a benefi-
ciary's income, the statute would then have effectively required the State to meet whatever
costs a beneficiary could not pay.") (emphasis in original); Morris, Civ. Action No. 80-172-N,
at 3 (state may "choose[ I to meet a portion, but not all, of the cost-sharing charges"); cf.
American Medical Ass'n v. Matthews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (noting that
legislative history behind Medicaid program indicated Congressional intent was "to en-
courage and preserve a wide measure of state autonomy ... in the determination of the
reasonable costs of Medicaid programs").
9 . REP. No. 404, supra note 6, at 79-80, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2020.
A State [Medicaid] plan may provide for the payment in full of any deduct-
ibles or cost sharing under the insurance program established by part B of title
XVIII. In the event, however, the State plan provides for the individual to assume
a portion of such costs, such portion shall be determined on a basis reasonably
related to the individual's [ability to pay].
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clear. The Samuel court, for instance, reviewed pertinent segments
of the history and came to the conclusion that the state was not
obligated to pay coinsurance.60 In addition, a key clause of the leg-
islative history to section 1396a(a)(15) explained that a "State
[Medicaid] plan may provide for the payment in full. '61 It is sub-
mitted that this language can reasonably be interpreted to mean
that a state may also pay less than the full coinsurance amount.2
B. OBRA 1986
There was no additional significant legislation regarding buy-
in agreements until the passage of the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1986 ("OBRA 1986"),6a which added two sections
to the Social Security Act pertinent to buy-in agreements:
1396a(a)(10)(E) 64 and 1396a(n).6 5 The former gave states the op-
tion to enter into buy-in agreements for QMBs 6 Under
1396a(a)(10)(E)(i), once a state elects to cover QMBs, it "must"
pay Part B cost-sharing.6 7 Since the definition of cost-sharing in-
cluded coinsurance,68 this section seemed to support the argument
that health care providers should recover the 20% not covered by
1o Compare Samuel, 570 F. Supp. at 570-71 (Medicaid legislative history does not guar-
antee provider full payment, but protects beneficiary from cost-sharing responsibilities be-
yond his or her means) with HHC, 954 F.2d at 860-61 (disagreeing with Samuel and "in-
clud[ing] in any examination of [Medicaid] legislative history an examination of the history
of the Medicare Act").
61 S. REP. No. 404, supra note 6, at 79, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2020 (empha-
sis added).
02 Unfortunately, review of the legislative history's "Section-by-Section Analysis" sheds
-no additional light on the matter. See S. REP. No. 404, supra note 6, at 177-78, reprinted in
1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2117-18 ("Section-by-Section Analysis" subpart relating to buy-in
agreements).
a Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9403, 100 Stat. 1874, 2053-56 (1986).
04 Id. § 9403(a)(3) (codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(E)). A state plan for Medi-
caid must provide, "at the option of a State.... for making medical assistance available for
medicare cost-sharing.., for qualified medicare beneficiaries." Id.
05 Id. § 9403(e) (codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(n)) (titled "Payment amounts").
"[T]he State [Medicaid] plan may provide payment in an amount.., exceeding the amount
that is otherwise payable under the State plan for the item or service for eligible individu-
als." Id.
00 See H.R. REP. No. 727, supra note 44, at 106, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3696
("Committee hopes States with constrained resources will consider pursuing this option as a
first step to more comprehensive coverage"); see also supra note 44 (QMB discussion).
67 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(E)(i).
11 Id. § 1396d(p)(3) (cost-sharing includes premiums, deductibles, and 20%
coinsurance).
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Medicare. 9 Moreover, part of the OBRA 1986 legislative history
buttressed this interpretation: "For [the] elderly . . .whom the
State chose to cover, the Medicaid program would pay for the Part
B deductible and the beneficiary's 20 percent coinsurance on Part
B services. 70
However, the second OBRA 1986 buy-in section noted
above-1396a(n), titled "Payment amounts"-was less favorable to
health care providers. 1 With regard to QMBs, section 1396a(n)
provided that the Medicaid payment plus the Medicare payment
"may" exceed the Medicaid rate for the item or service in ques-
tion.72 The use of "must" in section 1396a(a)(10)(E)(i) and the use
of "may" in section 1396a(n) are difficult to reconcile, and this con-
flict further evidences the ambiguity and inconsistencies in the
Medicaid statute.73
C. MCCA 1988
Soon after the enactment of OBRA 1986, the Medicare Cata-
strophic Coverage Act of 1988 ("MCCA 1988") was passed. 4
MCCA 1988 included two significant modifications to the then ex-
isting buy-in law. First, MCCA 1988 excised the option language
" See Patricia Nemore, Changes in OBRA-90 Affecting Medicaid Eligibility and Ser-
vices for the Elderly and Disabled, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1362, 1362 (1991) (noting De-
partment's interpretation, but proposing that state responsibility for 20% coinsurance was
"challengeable under provisions of the law defining 'cost-sharing' ").
70 H.R. REP. No. 727, supra note 44, at 106, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3696.
" See supra note 65 (pertinent part of § 1396a(n) set out).
72 See supra note 65 (§ 1396a(n) "may" language set out); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1012, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 395-96 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868, 4040-41 ("to-
tal of Medicaid payments for Medicare cost sharing ... together with Medicare payments
may exceed the amounts otherwise payable under the State Medicaid plan for such ser-
vices") (emphasis added).
11 In addition to the "must" versus "may" conflict, § 1396a(a)(10)(F)(II) contains a
"part or all" clause which, it is submitted, can reasonably be construed to clash with the
combined language of §§ 1396a(a)(10)(E)(i) and 1396d(p)(3), creating an additional ambigu-
ity. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (arguing that reading of §§
1396a(a)(10)(E)(i) and 1396d(p)(3) together militates in favor of full provider reimburse-
ment). Section 1396(a)(10)(F)(II) provides that
the making available of supplementary medical insurance benefits under part B of
[Medicare] to individuals eligible therefor ... or provision for meeting part or all
of the cost of deductibles, cost sharing, or similar charges under part B of [Medi-
care] ... shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the making available
of any such benefits, or the making available of services of the same amount, dura-
tion, and scope, to any other individuals ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(F)(II) (emphasis added).
"' Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683 (1988).
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from section 1396a(a)(10)(E), thereby making QMB buy-ins
mandatory.75 Second, MCCA 1988 deleted section 1396a(a)(15). 76
The full import of these changes, however, is not easily discerned,
especially when analyzed within the context of the confusing and
contradictory legislative history.
For example, the House Report seemed to support the provid-
ers' position by noting that "[s]tates would be required to pay the
Medicare premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance for all elderly
[who met income and resource requirements]. '  This notion was
repeated in a subsequent passage of the same report.78 Moreover,
the House Conference Report further solidified the notion of full
provider reimbursement.79 However, a hypothetical reimbursement
scenario included in the House Report seemed to support the argu-
ment that, at least in certain situations, states were not required to
pay more than their plan's Medicaid fee.80
D. OBRA 1989
If it can be said that most of the MCCA 1988 legislative his-
tory supported plaintiff's position in HHC, then it may likewise be
suggested that the bulk of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989 ("OBRA 1989") legislative history supported defendant's
position. The House Report accompanying OBRA 1989, for exam-
75 See id. at §301(a)(1) (1988) (deletion of option language); 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396a(a)(10)(E)(i) (current statute reflecting deletion).
76 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(15), repealed by Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 301(e)(2)(C), as added by Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-485, § 608(d)(14)(I)(iii), 102 Stat. 2343, 2416 (1988).
77 See H.R. REP. No. 105(11), supra not6 44, at 60, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
883.
", See H.R. REP. No. 105(11), supra note 44, at 61, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
884. "The bill would require States to pay Medicare cost-sharing, including coninsurance
[sic], on behalf of eligible individuals." Id.
7' See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 661, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 253 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 923, 1031 ("[m]akes mandatory the current option for States to pay Medicare
premiums, deductibles and coinsurance").
80 See H.R. REP. No. 105(11), supra note 44, at 61, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
884.
For example, assume that a physician actually charges a "buy-in" patient $60 for
performing a particular procedure; that Medicare recognizes $50 as the reasonable
charge; and that the State Medicaid program only pays $35 for this procedure....
Medicare will pay only 80 percent of $50, leaving a $10 coinsurance obligation for
the beneficiary. However, since the State only recognizes $35 as the fee for the
procedure in question, and since the Medicare program has already paid the phy-
sician $40, the State is not required to pay any of the $10 coinsurance.
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ple, stated that "Medicaid programs typically pay the Medicare co-
insurance only to the extent that their payment, plus the Medicare
payment, does not exceed what the Medicaid program would pay
for the service in question.""' In addition, the report concluded
that the proposed bill was not intended to alter the current prac-
tice by the states of capping Part B coinsurance payments at the
Medicaid rate. 2
E. Summary of Statutory Evolution
Congress enacted four pieces of legislation related to buy-in
agreements.83 When viewed as a whole, it is suggested that the laws
did not communicate a clear legislative mandate regarding state
liability for coinsurance.84 In light of this, the HHC court should
have given deference to the Department's interpretation, provided
that the interpretation was permissible. Whether the interpreta-
tion was permissible is explored in Part III.
III. IMPERMISSIBLE AGENCY INTERPRETATION?
DEPARTMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF BUY-IN LAW
FROM 1971 TO PRESENT
A. 1971 Department Policy
A 1971 Department internal memorandum titled "Policy In-
S, H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1906, 2090 (emphasis added). But see HHC, 954 F.2d at 861 (court discounted weight of
"subsequent legislative history").
82 See H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 81, at 364, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2090
(proposed legislation regarding physicians' services "does not change the current policy re-
garding the amount which a Medicaid program must reimburse on such claims").
8 See supra notes 52-82 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts within Medicare
and Medicaid statutes and legislative histories).
8" See generally Kinney, supra note 21, at 864-65 ("eligibility requirements for the
Medicaid program are complex and ... byzantine"). "Since Medicaid's inception, Congress
has repeatedly changed eligibility requirements to address specific needs. The result ... is a
highly technical, virtually incomprehensible body of Medicaid eligibility law." Id. at 864-65
(footnote omitted).
Indeed, federal courts have set forth colorful characterizations of the Social Security
Act in general, and these characterizations seem applicable to the portions of the Act rela-
tive to buy-ins. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) (characterizing So-
cial Security Act as "Byzantine"); Friedman v. Berger, 409 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd, 547 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977) (describing Medi-
caid statute as "an aggravated assault on the English language"); id. (depicting statute as
"murky" and as "poor example to those who would like to use plain and simple
expressions").
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formation Memo No. 6" seems to represent the agency's initial po-
sition with respect to buy-in coinsurance reimbursement.8 5 Of most
importance to the HHC case, paragraph 5 of the memorandum de-
clared that a state must pay "only that amount which will satisfy
the requirement for payment in full according to the [Medicaid]
method of payment. '8 6 Paragraph 2 of the same memorandum,
however, explained that "[a] state may not limit its payment of
deductibles and co-insurance to those services provided by Part B
benefits that are otherwise included in the [Medicaid] plans. '"87
B. 1981 Morris Case
An Alabama federal district court in James v. Morris appears
to be the first to adjudicate a claim relative to coinsurance reim-
bursement.8 Although the court did not specifically refer to any
Department policy, its decision was consistent with paragraph 5 of
Memo No. 6.89 According to the court, Alabama's Medicaid plan
called for the State to pay "all or part of the cost of the deductible
[and] cost-sharing... under Part B."90 The Morris court first con-
cluded that the "all or part" language did not violate federal buy-
in statutes.9 The court then held that Alabama was "not required
to pay the cost-sharing charges for health care services which
[were] not covered in the [Medicaid] Plan." 92 Thus, paragraph 5 of
the Department's Memo No. 6 was tacitly affirmed and paragraph
2 was rejected. 3
65 See Joint Appendix at 75, HHC, 954 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-6123).
86 Id. at para. 5 (emphasis added).
11 Id. at para. 2 ("When a State agency enters into a buy-in agreement[,] all the bene-
fits under Part B become part of the State plan for individuals covered under the agree-
ment."). The following example is submitted to help illustrate: if Medicare Part B covered
Procedures X and Y, and if a given state's Medicaid program covered Procedures Y and Z,
then the state may not, according to paragraph 2 of Memo No. 6, limit its payment of
deductibles and coinsurance only to Procedure Y. By implication, the state must pay de-
ductibles and coinsurance for Procedure X.
88 James v. Morris, Civ. Action No. 80-172-N (M.D. Ala., N. Div., Apr. 29, 1981).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 85-86 (discussing paragraph 5 of Department's
Memo No. 6).
" Morris, Civ. Action No. 80-172-N, at 2 (emphasis added).
01 Id. at 3 ("[Section 1396a(a)(15)] does not ... mandate that a portion of the cost-
sharing charges be met.").
9' Id. at cover page. This portion of the Morris holding impliedly disaffirmed the less
important paragraph 2 of Memo No. 6. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing paragraph 2).
'3 Regarding post-Morris developments relative to paragraph 2, see, e.g., MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID GUIDE, supra note 55, at 15,777 (discussing Department's final rule recognizing
1993]
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C. 1981 Reiteration of 1971 Department Policy
The next policy announcement by the Department was the
1981 "Policy Information for All Regions" memorandum published
by the Department Director, Bureau of Program Policy, five
months after Morris was decided.9 4 This memorandum reiterated
the 1971 policy statement regarding the Medicaid rate cap. 5
In the same memorandum, the Director addressed a special
provider billing arrangement that allowed a provider that had not
been paid by a state Medicaid agency to collect from the patient in
certain circumstances."6 The HHC defendant conceded that this
arrangement was correctly stricken by a federal district court in
Samuel v. California Department of Health Services.9 The HHC
court seized on this concession and the Samuel court ruling as a
dramatic policy shift that was significant to the instant question of
whether the Department's statutory interpretation should be ac-
corded deference. 8 However, it is submitted that this billing ar-
rangement was not pertinent to the issue before the HHC court,
i.e., the State's obligation to pay Part B coinsurance was the ques-
tion in HHC, not the patient's obligation when the provider did
not bill the Medicaid program at all.9 9 Therefore, even if Depart-
ment policy was inconsistent, the inconsistency had no bearing on
and codifying Morris case with respect to non-covered services). See generally infra notes
101-107 and accompanying text (discussion of Department's 1983 and 1988 proposed and
final rules).
9 See Joint Appendix, supra note 85, at 74 (Department memorandum dated Septem-
ber 29, 1981, from Peter Bouxsein, Bureau of Program Policy, to Associate Regional Admin-
istrator, Division of Program Operations, Region IX).
See id. (referring to "longstanding policy" originally announced in paragraph 5 of
1971 Memo No. 6).
96 See id. (arrangement provided that "[i]f the [state Medicaid] agency hald] made no
payment at all, the physician/supplier may collect coinsurance and deductibles from the
[Medicaid] eligible patient").
97 570 F. Supp. 566, 573 (N.D. Cal. 1983), as amended by 572 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Cal.
1983) ("[c]ourt disagrees with the State interpretation" that dual eligibles may be charged
for cost-sharing); Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 30, at 29 n.* (acknowledging that policy re-
garding beneficiary liability was correctly stricken by Samuel court).
98 See HHC, 954 F.2d at 861-62 ("expertise in statutory interpretation to which we
normally defer becomes dubious when the expert cannot make up his own mind").
"' Compare Joint Appendix, supra note 85, at 74 (1981 Department memo) (If Medi-
caid "has made no payment at all, the physician/supplier may collect coinsurance and de-
ductibles from the [Medicaid] eligible patient.") (emphasis added) with HHC, 954 F.2d at
857-58 ("we must determine what New York State's responsibility is . . . for ... 20% of
reasonable costs") (emphasis added); see also HHC, 1991 WL 41559, at *5 ("real target of
plaintiffs' claims ... is not the beneficiary, but the state and its Medicaid plan").
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the HHC case. 00
D. 1983 and 1988: Proposed and Final Rules in Response to
Morris Case
In March 1983, the Department proposed new regulations
to adopt the Morris holding, requiring only optional state cost-
sharing responsibility for Medicare Part B services not covered in
the state Medicaid plan.1 1 This proposed rule became final in 1987
and effective in January 1988.102 In addition to codifying this por-
tion of Morris, the narrative accompanying the final rule re-
sponded to various commentators' questions with respect to buy-in
reimbursement requirements. 103 One question was "whether States
had the option to limit payment of Part B cost sharing amounts in
accordance with state limitations imposed on Medicaid services
covered under the state plan."'01 4 The Department's answer was
"[y]es.' 10 5 It is submitted that this affirmative response was rea-
sonable and consistent with paragraph 5 of the Department's 1971
Memo No. 6106 and with the Department's policy announcement of
1981.107
E. Summary of Agency Interpretation
The Medicare buy-in legislation is conflicting and ambigu-
ous. 08 Because of this profound disarray in the law, it is submitted
"I Cf. HHC, 954 F.2d at 867-68 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) ("What is more important
[than inconsistency] is whether the agency's change in position rests on a 'well-considered
basis'. ") (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355-56 (1989)).
101 See Proposed Rule, Medicaid Program, Relation With Other Agencies, and Miscel-
laneous Medicaid Definitions, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,378 (1983) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 431.625)
(proposed Mar. 11, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 NPRM]. The James v. Morris case discussed in
Part II, Subpart B of this Comment was incorrectly referred to as James v. Harris in the
1983 NPRM. See Final Rule, Medicaid Program; Relations With Other Agencies, Miscella-
neous Medicaid Definitions, Third Party Liability Quality Control, and Limitations on Fed-
eral Funds for Abortions, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,926 (1987) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 431.625) (cor-
rected at 53 Fed. Reg. 657) (effective Jan. 18, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Final Rule].
102 See 1988 Final Rule, supra note 101.
203 Id. (29 commentators posed questions based on 1983 NPRM; Department grouped
similar questions and published 12 comments and responses).
10I Id. (comment 8).
105 Id. (response to comment 8).
0' See supra text accompanying note 86 (quoting pertinent portion of paragraph 5).
107 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (noting 1981 Department reiteration
of 1971 policy).
1o See supra notes 52-84 and accompanying text (discussing of conflicting and incon-
sistent buy-in statutes).
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that alternative regulatory positions were permissible, and that one
of these possible positions was the Department's. 109 Because the
Department's interpretation was reasonable, 110 the court in HHC
should not have intervened."'
109 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (Morris and Samuel decisions regarding
discretionary nature of states' cost-sharing obligations support Department's position);
supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text ("may" terminology in § 1396a(a)(15) legislative
history supports Department's position); supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text ("may"
language in § 1396a(n) supports Department's position); supra note 80 and accompanying
text (explanation of Medicaid cap in MCCA 1988 legislative history supports Department's
position); supra note 81-82 and accompanying text (explanation of Medicaid cap in OBRA
1989 legislative history supports Department's position); see also Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("[Ilf the statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.") (footnote omitted); id. at 843
n.11 ("court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly
could have adopted to uphold the construction"); Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981) (to uphold regulation "it is not neces-
sary for a court to find that the agency's construction was the only reasonable one or even
the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding") (footnote omitted). But see HHC, 1991 WL 41559, at *5 (court did "not mean
to suggest that [health care providers'] position with respect [to] the buy-in agreements
[was] wholly unsupportable").
Agency regulations, like the NYDSS regulation at issue in HHC, control unless they are:
1) "arbitrary," 2) "capricious," or 3) "manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 844. The Department's consistent and reasonable policy with respect to the states' coin-
surance obligations, it is suggested, seems to be well within the generous latitude provided
to agencies by Chevron. See generally Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations
Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3 (1990) ("law governing judi-
cial acceptance of agencies' interpretations of the statutes they administer is now dominated
by Chevron"). Even assuming arguendo that the Department's policy revision with respect
to non-covered Part B services was pertinent to the HHC case, see supra note 99 and ac-
companying text (suggesting that New York's obligations, not patients', were in issue), it is
submitted that this revision in and of itself was not grounds for not deferring to the agency
interpretation. See Anthony, supra, at 27 ("agency may change its view, provided the new
interpretation is consistent with statute and reasonable, and the change was based on rea-
soned decisionmaking, adequately explained") (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64).
11 See text accompanying notes 104-107 (suggesting that Department's 1988 Final Rule
and accompanying narrative was reasonable construction of buy-in statutes and consistent
with Department policy pronouncements of 1971 and 1981).
"I See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 112 S.Ct. 1394, 1401
(1992) ("Judicial deference to reasonable interpretations by an agency of a statute that it
administers is a dominant, well settled principle of federal law."); United States v. City of
Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 666 (1986) ("We must uphold [the agency's] interpretation if the stat-
ute yields up no definitive contrary legislative command and if the [agency's] approach is a
reasonable one.") (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45).
The Department, arguably, has been accorded even greater deference in cases involving
construction of the Social Security Act. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,
43 (1981) ("Perhaps appreciating the complexity of what it had wrought, Congress conferred
on the Secretary exceptionally broad authority to prescribe standards for applying certain
sections of the Act.") (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977)) (emphasis
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CONCLUSION
The statutes and legislative history pertaining to Medicare
Part B buy-in agreements are unclear, and the interpretation of
the responsible federal agency was permissible. The agency inter-
pretation, therefore, should have been accorded deference by the
Second Circuit, and the regulation in issue should not have been
invalidated. It is hoped that the arguments advanced in this Com-
ment will help spur Congress to clarify the buy-in law and will as-
sist present and prospective litigants in jurisdictions outside New
York who seek outcomes different than the one in HHC.112
Christopher P. Parnagian
EDITOR'S NOTE
On the eve of this Comment's publication, a federal district
court in Alabama decided Haynes Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Ala-
bama, No. CIV.A.92-H-879-N, 1993 WL 147940 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 16,
1993) (mem.), a case with facts, a procedural setting, and applica-
ble law identical, for analytical purposes, to HHC's. The Haynes
court granted defendant Department's motion for summary judg-
ment. This ruling is consistent with the arguments set forth in this
Comment, and contrary to the holding in HHC.
added); cf. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977) ("Congress entrusts to the Secre-
tary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory
term."); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977) ("language [of Medicaid Act] confers broad
discretion on the States to adopt standards for determining the extent of medical assistance,
requiring only that such standards be 'reasonable' and 'consistent with the objectives' of the
Act") (footnote omitted).
112 See Pines, supra note 34, at 54 (HHC decision was "awaited by health care provid-
ers in some 30 other states that have imposed similar cuts").
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